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Abstract
Background: The 2009 H1N1 outbreak provides an opportunity to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of current U.S.
public health surveillance systems and to identify implications for measuring public health emergency preparedness.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We adopted a ‘‘triangulation’’ approach in which multiple contemporary data sources,
each with different expected biases, are compared to identify time patterns that are likely to reflect biases versus those that
are more likely to be indicative of actual infection rates. This approach is grounded in the understanding that surveillance
data are the result of a series of decisions made by patients, health care providers, and public health professionals about
seeking and providing health care and about reporting cases to health authorities. Although limited by the lack of a gold
standard, this analysis suggests that children and young adults are over-represented in many pH1N1 surveillance systems,
especially in the spring wave. In addition, the nearly two-month delay between the Northeast and the South in the Fall peak
in some surveillance data seems to at least partially reflect regional differences in concerns about pH1N1rather than real
differences in pH1N1 infection rates.
Conclusions/Significance: Although the extent of the biases suggested by this analysis cannot be known precisely, the
analysis identifies underlying problems with surveillance systems – in particular their dependence on patient and provider
behavior, which is influenced by a changing information environment – that could limit situational awareness in future
public health emergencies. To improve situational awareness in future health emergencies, population-based surveillance
systems such as telephone surveys of representative population samples and seroprevalence surveys in well-defined
population cohorts are needed.
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Background and Objectives
In the Spring of 2009, a novel H1N1 influenza virus, now
denoted pH1N1, emerged in North America and spread to the rest
of the world in less than two months [1]. In the United States,
where some of the first cases emerged, one of the public health
challenges was to track the spread of the new virus and
characterize its epidemiologic properties in order to guide and
monitor the effects of response efforts. Existing public health
surveillance and laboratory systems rapidly developed a case
definition and new testing procedures, but public health labora-
tories soon became overloaded with samples to be tested, and
surveillance definitions and procedures were changed as necessary
to handle the load. Later in the year, as the epidemiological
characteristics of the new H1N1 subtype emerged, traditional
influenza surveillance systems were augmented with new systems
tailored to the emerging epidemiology [2]. Some of these new
systems could be described as syndromic surveillance approaches,
which by using pre-diagnostic data, were thought to have a distinct
advantage over the traditional surveillance method in terms of
timeliness [3].
The epidemiology of pH1N1 has been well described elsewhere
[4,5], and adding to this understanding is not the goal of this
paper. Rather, our purpose is to learn from the 2009 H1N1
experience about the strengths and weaknesses of current U.S.
public health surveillance systems and to identify implications for
measuring public health emergency preparedness. To do this we
focus on two critical issues. First, we address the widely-held
perception that children and young adults were at ‘‘higher risk.’’
Second, we assess the validity and utility of syndromic surveillance
systems that were promoted by the President’s Council of Advisors
on Science and Technology (PCAST) [3] and other authorities.
Both of these questions relate to the ability of public health
surveillance systems to provide ‘‘situational awareness,’’ critical
information needed to respond to disease outbreaks and other
public health emergencies. This includes numbers of cases and
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other traditional surveillance data as well as information on critical
response resources, medical care capacity, environmental threats,
and public awareness [6].
We begin with a discussion of the data and methods employed
in this paper, including indicators of the information environment
during 2009 and how that might have biased the available
surveillance data. We then review (1) the evidence regarding
differential age-specific risks associated with pH1N1 and (2)
surveillance systems’ ability to accurately monitor pH1N1 cases
over time. The discussion section addresses the limitations of this
study, the implications of this analysis regarding both the strengths
and weaknesses of current surveillance systems and alternatives
that should be considered for the future, and the implications of
this analysis for the measurement of public health preparedness.
Results
The information environment
By way of background for the subsequent analyses, Figure 1
Panel A represents trends in the number of U.S. Google searches
for ‘‘swine flu’’ between April and December of 2009 on a scale of
0 to 100. Both the number of general searches (labeled as ‘‘Activity
index’’) and news searches (‘‘News index’’) both grow rapidly from
0 in mid-April to 100 in the week ending May 2, 2009,
corresponding to a rapid set of announcements from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the WHO about
the emergence of the pandemic. Both indices drop off by the end
of May. The general searches, but not the news searches, pick up
again at the end of August, reaching a peak of 13 on a scale of 0 to
100 at the end of October, and drop off to zero by the end of the
year.
Figure 1 Panel B presents the Google Insights Activity index for
the United States as well as for Massachusetts and Georgia,
populous and presumably typical states in CDC Regions 1
(Northeast) and 4 (the South) respectively. In the south, ‘‘swine flu’’
searches peaked at the end of August at 15 and again at 12 in mid-
October. In the Northeast, on the other hand, the activity index
peaked at 19 at the end of October, higher and a week later than
the United States as a whole.
Age-related risks of pH1N1
One of the most commonly held perceptions about pH1N1 is
that children and young adults are at especially ‘‘high risk.’’ For
instance, on May 17, 2009 in an article entitled ‘‘Age of Flu
Victims Has Big Implications,’’ the Washington Post reported that
‘‘perhaps the most worrisome features so far are the number and
severity of cases in teenagers and young adults. This was noticed
early, and the pattern has not changed much now that there are
5,000 laboratory-confirmed infections and probably more than
100,000 overall. The average age of the confirmed and probable
cases is 15 years. Two-thirds are younger than 18.’’ [7] Similarly,
an August 2009 PCAST report said that confirmed cases were
concentrated in younger age groups, up to age 24, almost all
severe cases were in people younger than age 65, and the
consequences of infection in this epidemic were already known to
be far more severe for children and young adults, and seemingly
milder for people over age 65 [3].
With seasonal influenza, serious illness requiring hospitalization
and death are uncommon in children (except for infants) and
young adults, so this pattern has important public health
implications. Indeed the fact that the first cases of pH1N1 that
came to light in southern California, Mexico, and in New York
City were in children and young adults was an important clue that
a new pandemic viral subtype had emerged [8]. The perception,
based on these reports, that children and young adults were ‘‘at
risk’’ also led to school closings in the Spring of 2009 [9,10], the
issuance of recommendations for schools, universities, and day
care centers [11], and recommendations that children and
adolescents be given priority for immunizations [12]. The same
assumption also influenced recommendations from the WHO
[13].
Regarding the other end of the age spectrum, on May 22, 2009
CDC reported the early results of an antibody study indicating
that children had no existing cross-reactive antibody to pH1N1,
while about one-third of adults older than 60 years of age had such
a reaction. These results were attributed to the possibility that
older people had been previously exposed, either through infection
or vaccination, to an influenza A(H1N1) virus that was more
closely related to pH1N1 than contemporary seasonal influenza
viruses [14].
Figure 1. Google ‘‘Swine Flu’’ indices for the Northeast, South and entire United States Panel A. Google Insights ‘‘Swine Flu’’ activity and
news indices, U.S., April 12, 2009–January 2, 2010. Panel B. Google Insights ‘‘Swine Flu’’ activity index, U.S., Georgia (GA), and Massachusetts (MA),
August 2, 2009–January 2, 2010. Source: Google Insights search for ‘‘swine flu’’ at http://www.google.com/insights/search/
#q = SWINE%20FLU&geo = US&date = 1%2F2009%2012m&cmpt = q.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040984.g001
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Typical of the information available early in the pandemic, a
report from CDC published ahead of print by the New England
Journal of Medicine on May 7, 2009 noted that 60% of 642
confirmed cases were 18 years of age or younger [15]. Similarly, in
a report on 272 patients who were hospitalized with laboratory-
confirmed pH1N1 from April to mid-June 2009 found that 45%
were under the age of 18 and 5% were 65 years of age or older
[16]. Another early study, published in CDC’s Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report in late August, reported that the attack
rate was highest among children aged 5–14 years (147 per 100,000
population), 14 times higher than the rate for adults aged 60 and
older [17]. Shortly afterwards, a CDC pediatric deaths surveil-
lance study reported that children under 18 years of age
represented 36 of the 477 laboratory-confirmed pH1N1 deaths
through early August [18].
National, population-based hospitalization and mortality rates
did not become available until after CDC established AHDRA in
August 2009. Using data from the states reporting laboratory-
confirmed cases, CDC reported that the highest rates of
hospitalizations were observed among the 0–4-year-old age group,
which had rates 2- to 3-fold higher than those observed in the
other age groups (see Figure 2 Panel A). In addition, the majority
of hospitalizations (.70%) reported were in patients less than 50
years of age and fewer than 10% were in patients 65 years of age
or older [4]. Using data from AHDRA, CDC reported that ‘‘the
age distribution of laboratory-confirmed pH1N1 influenza–asso-
ciated death rate was markedly different from that seen in typical
influenza seasons. In contrast to typical influenza seasons, when
90% of deaths occur in the elderly population, 86% of pH1N1
deaths reported to AHDRA were in persons under 65 years of age,
with the highest rates found in persons aged 50–64 years’’ (Figure 2
Panel C) [4].
To properly understand the risks, one must first recognize that
there are two different risks in question: incidence (the risk that
someone becomes infected) and severity (the risk of suffering
consequences such as severe illness requiring hospitalization or
even death). Based on data from the CDC EIP program [19],
Figure 2 Panel B presents the attack rate as well as the population-
based hospitalization and death rates by age. The age-specific
attack rates, which reflect the percentage of the population
infected at some point during the pandemic, do bear out the
elevated risk to children (23.4% for children under age 18 and
17.5% for adults aged 18–64 vs. 14.2 percent for those aged 65
and older). The hospitalization rates show a similar pattern: 104.0
per 100,000 for children under age 18, 79.2 per 100,000 for adults
aged 18–64, and 65.4 per 100,000 for those aged 65 and older.
While the attack and hospitalization rates are higher for children
than for adults, the rates for children are less than twice that for
seniors, not quite as dramatic as some of the figures presented at
the beginning of this section. Death rates, on the other hand, are
substantially higher for adults aged 18–64 than for those under 18
(4.72 vs. 1.56 per 100,000), with the rate for 65 and older
population at an intermediate level of 3.88 per 100,000.
These rates, presented in Figure 2 Panels B, C, and D, however,
are all based on certain assumptions that must be examined. The
basis for the estimates is the number of influenza-associated
hospitalizations reported in CDC’s EIP program, which covers 62
counties in 10 states, not the number of pH1N1 cases,
hospitalizations, and deaths reported to state and local health
officials (individual case reporting was discontinued in May 2009
when laboratory capacity proved insufficient to handle the surge in
number of potential cases). Reed and colleagues estimate these
multipliers based on a variety of data relating to both seasonal and
pH1N1 influenza, but assume that they are the same for every age
group and constant over time (except that they account for the
change in testing recommendations on May 12) [20]. The number
of incident cases is estimated as a constant multiple of the number
of confirmed cases, which explains why the estimated age-specific
attack and hospitalization rates have similar patterns. The
multipliers are based on estimates of the fraction of influenza
cases in which health care is sought, specimens are tested, and the
tests are positive [20].
However, by mid-May, the number of clinical samples being
submitted to state labs for testing became overwhelming, and
CDC and state health departments recommended viral testing
only if it would affect their care, and states no longer reported
individual confirmed and probable cases to CDC [21]. Moreover,
as case counts grew, aggregate reporting replaced individual case
reports in most jurisdictions, and most symptomatic cases were not
tested, confirmed, or reported, and the proportion tested varied
geographically and over time [22]. Combined with the perceptions
that children were at higher risk and older adults less so, it is
possible that children and young adults with influenza-like illness
(ILI) would be more likely to seek care and to be tested, and older
adults less so. Population-based BRFSS data suggest that between
September, 2009 and March, 2010, health care was sought by
56% of children with self-reported ILI, compared to 40% of adults
[23], and it is possible that the differential was stronger earlier in
the outbreak, when fears about the risks for children were more
common.
Regarding the attack rate, BRFSS survey data suggest that
between September, 2009 and March, 2010, the average monthly
proportion of children under age 18 who reported having
experienced ILI in the preceding 30 days was 28.4%, compared
to 8.1% in adults [23]. These percentages vary by month, but at
their peak in November (referring to illness in October and
November) they were 35.9% for children and 20.4% for adults.
No national data are available for the spring wave, but a survey
conducted in New York City in mid-June found self-reported ILI
prevalence rates of 20% and 22% in children aged 0 to 4 and 5 to
17 respectively, vs. 10% and 6% in adults aged 18 to 64 and 65
and older respectively [24].
With respect to hospitalizations and deaths, the patterns in
Figure 2 Panel C based on EIP data are similar to those based on
the AHDRA surveillance system summarized in Panel A. In
reporting the AHDRA rates, Jhung and colleagues make the point
that the age distributions are markedly different than those for
seasonal influenza [4]. These CDC estimates do not, however,
show that children have a higher risk of dying than adults. Indeed,
if reckoned in terms of the case fatality rate, the proportion of cases
who die of the disease, the risks would be skewed even more
towards older groups since the denominator (the number infected)
is lower. Moreover, following the announcement of the CDC
antibody study suggesting that older adults has some residual
protection against H1N1 viruses, it is possible that seniors with ILI
might not have been tested and their subsequent pH1N1 related
death not classified as such. Correcting for such an effect, about
which there is no statistical evidence, would increase the pH1N1-
associated death rate in the 65 and older age group.
Given concerns about the perceived severity of pH1N1 for
children, parents might have been more likely to seek medical care
for their children than in previous years or compared to adults
with the same symptoms. McDonnell and colleagues find evidence
of this effect, at least for the spring wave, in an analysis of data
from an integrated hospital system operating 18 hospital EDs.
During the week beginning April 27, 2009, the number of
pediatric (18 years or younger) ED visits increased 19.7% from the
previous week, compared to 1.0 percent for adult patients. In
Effectiveness of Situational Awareness for H1N1
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 August 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 8 | e40984
addition, the proportion of pediatric ED patients admitted to the
hospital decreased 5.6 percentage points from 23.2% to 17.6%,
while the adult admission rates were decreased only 0.6 percentage
points from 13.3% to 12.7% [25]. In another study done by Dugas
and colleagues, the Google Flu Trends web search queries were
correlated with weekly visits at the pediatric ED but not the adult
ED during the three waves of pH1N1 peaks [54]. Since pH1N1
was very much in the news in this week but there were not likely to
be many actual cases in the hospital system’s population, these
findings suggest that the increase in pediatric ED cases represents
parent over-reaction.
A similar effect can be seen in ED utilization and hospital
admission rates in New York City [26]. As shown in Figure 3
Panel A, pediatric ED visits with ILI as a chief complaint peaked
in late April, following the news about pH1N1 cases in high school
students who had travelled to Mexico and their class mates, and
rose sharply around May 15, when the global pandemic was
prominent in the news. Figure 3 Panel B, however, indicates that
laboratory-confirmed hospital admissions did not peak until May
26, suggesting that some ED visits earlier in the month reflected
parental concern rather than pH1N1 infection.
A comparison of data from EIP coverage areas in New York
State with an alternative sentinel hospital program (SHP)
surveillance system established to monitor pH1N1, however,
shows the opposite effect. Analyzing data from October 1, 2009
through March 31, 2010, Noyes and colleagues note that the age
distribution of confirmed cases is very different in the two
surveillance systems: children comprise 59% of SHP admissions
but only 27% of EIP admissions [27]. These figures suggest that
children might be at a higher risk of pH1N1-related hospitalization
that the CDC EIP estimates suggest. However, the two
surveillance systems differ in a number of ways that might effect
this comparison: they cover different counties within the state, and
the SHP program includes only data from a single surveillance
hospital in a given area compared to the comprehensive coverage
of the EIP. Perhaps more importantly, according to the authors, is
the dependence on provider-driven testing practices. The EIP’s
nationally-defined protocol might have missed cases presenting
with atypical clinical presentations or whose rapid influenza test
(which is known to have a low sensitivity for pH1N1) was a false
negative. The SHP, on the other hand, tested all patients admitted
with ILI [27]. It is also possible that these factors differed between
children and adults. Another dimension is the time period covered.
The CDC EIP estimates refer to April 2009 through January 16,
2010, with most cases distributed in roughly equal parts between
the spring wave (April through July) and the fall wave (August
through November). The New York analysis, on the other hand,
covers October 1, 2009 through March 31, 2010, and finds that
Figure 2. pH1N1 infection, hospitalization, and death rates. Panel A. Aggregate hospitalization and death reporting activity (AHDRA)
hospitalization and death rates per 100,000 population by age group, laboratory-confirmed pH1N1 influenza infection—United States, August 2009–
February 2010. Source: Jhung, 2011. Panel B, C & D. 2009 H1N1-Related Deaths, Hospitalizations and Cases, U.S. April 2009–January 16, 2010. Author’s
calculations based on CDC EIP program estimates: Updated CDC estimates of 2009 H1N1 influenza cases, hospitalizations and deaths in the United
States, April 2009–April 10, 2010 Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/estimates_2009_h1n1.htm.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040984.g002
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the SHP data include a sustained number of ILI admissions in
December and January.
Thus, the picture about the age-specific risks of pH1N1 that
emerges from these analyses is mixed. With respect to the risk of
infection per se, it does appear that children were more likely than
adults to report ILI in population-based surveys, but these suggest
that the ratio is closer to 2 to 1 than 14 to 1 (to cite an extreme
example [17]). The age-specific rate of hospitalization for pH1N1
influenza also seems to be higher for children than adults, falling
from 104.0 per 100,000 for ages 0–17 years to 64.4 per 100,000
for ages 65 and older (see Figure 2). However, these estimates are
highly dependent on unverified assumptions and there are
indications that these rates are and may have varied substantially
during the pandemic, so the apparently higher rates in children,
less than a 2 to 1 ratio, are somewhat uncertain. Finally, with
respect to mortality rates, CDC’s estimate for the 18 to 64 age
group is more than 3 times as high as for children under age 18
(4.72 vs. 1.56 per 100,000). The population-based mortality rate
for age 65 and older is less than for age 18 to 64, but more than
twice that for children (3.88 vs. 1.56 per 100,000), and it is possible
that the 65 and older rate is an underestimate due to under-
reporting.
Monitoring pH1N1 cases over time
It is generally accepted that pH1N1 influenza activity in the
United States occurred in two distinct waves, the first peaking in
Figure 3. Influenza-related emergency department visits and hospitalizations. Panel A. Rate of ILI syndrome visits (based on chief
complaint) to New York City emergency departments by age group, April 1, 2009–July 6, 2009. Panel B. Laboratory-confirmed H1N1 hospital
admissions and emergency department (ED) Visits for ILI in New York City, April 1, 2009–July 6, 2009. Source: New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene Health Alert #27: Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza update, revised reporting requirements and testing procedures Available
from: http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/cd/2009/09md27.pdf.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040984.g003
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June 2009 and the second in October 2009 [2]. However, the
specific timing of these waves, and how the timing may have
varied in different regions of the country, is less certain. In
particular, trends and patterns in surveillance data may be related
to awareness – both by patients and healthcare providers – about
the risks of pH1N1.
To explore this hypothesis, we first consider surveillance reports
from the spring pandemic wave with data from two of the key near
real-time surveillance systems as they appeared at the end of June,
2009, about two months into the spring wave [28]. By convention,
the weeks are numbered starting at the beginning of January.
Figure 4 presents data from CDC’s ILINet system, reflecting the
proportion of outpatient visits for influenza-like illness. The
proportion of visits for ILI increased sharply in Week 17, which
ended on May 2, 2009, to 2.8%, a level that exceeds the national
baseline and is more characteristic of the winter months. Figure 5,
which displays the number and percentage of respiratory
specimens in the United States testing positive for influenza
reported by WHO/NREVSS collaborating laboratories, also
shows a dramatic increase in the number of positive specimens –
represented by the height of the bar – for Week 17. These peaks
correspond temporally to a rapid series of announcements, starting
on Tuesday April 21 of human-to-human transmission in
California of a new viral sub-type, of a major outbreak in Mexico,
of confirmed cases in New York City students who had travelled to
Mexico, confirmation of world-wide spread of the new virus
leading to an increase in the WHO’s pandemic alert level, and
closing of approximately 300 U.S. schools. Note that Figure 3
shows a similar peak at the end of April in New York City hospital
ED visits for ILI.
One possible explanation for these peaks is that they reflect the
rapid spread of ILI throughout the United States. It is also
possible, however, that they reflect increased concern about the
pandemic, leading people to seek health care for symptoms they
might otherwise treat themselves, and physicians to send clinical
samples in for testing. Indeed the Google Insights activity index, as
shown in Figure 1, grew from 0 to 100 during this time, and never
rose to more than 15 throughout the rest of 2009.
Moreover, a closer examination of Figure 5 shows that it is the
number of samples submitted, not the number positive, that
accounts for the sharp increase in Week 17. Of the 3911 samples
tested in Week 16, 7.1% were positive for influenza. In Week 17,
the number of samples submitted grew to 30,020, but only 12.3%
were positive for influenza. And excluding the specimens that were
determined to be influenza A but sub-typing was not done, at most
4.6% of the samples submitted in Week 17 were possibly pH1N1
(i.e. either determined to be novel H1N1 or unsubtypable
influenza A). As shown by the black line in Figure 5, the
proportion positive for influenza grows to about 40% in June, but
the maximum proportion of samples submitted that might be
pH1N1 never exceeds 35% (based on the author’s calculations and
not shown in the figure). Since the proportion of submitted
samples that can possibly be pH1N1 was so low in Weeks 17 and
18, it seems likely that the sharp increase depicted in Figure 5 does
not represent rapid spread of the pandemic virus in the U.S.
population but rather increased awareness on the part of patients
in seeking care and physicians in sending clinical samples for
testing.
The fall wave presents an opportunity to assess the ability of
surveillance systems to monitor regional trends pH1N1. In
particular, it was widely noted that the fall wave began earlier in
the South and later in the Northeast. This pattern can be seen
clearly in the ILINet data in Figure 6, and also in percent of
samples submitted to WHO/NREVSS that were positive for
Figure 4. Outpatient influenza-like illness surveillance. Percentage of visits for ILI Reported by the U.S. Outpatient Influenza-like Illness
Surveillance Network (ILINet), National Summary 2008–09 and Previous Two Seasons. Source: CDC Flu View, 2008–2009 Influenza Season Week 25
ending June 27, 2009. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives2008-2009/weekly25.htm.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040984.g004
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influenza (not shown). The patterns in Google Flu Trends data,
thought to be a proxy for the number of people with flu symptoms,
for the same period (but using Georgia and Massachusetts as
proxies for the regions, since the data are available for selected
states and not region) are remarkably similar. However,
DiSTRIBuTE project ED surveillance data from the same states
(which are only available starting in October) display a somewhat
different pattern. In both Georgia and Massachusetts, the
difference between the maximum and minimum is much less
than in either the ILINet or Google Flu Trends data. The Georgia
DiSTRIBuTE data drop throughout the entire period, as do the
ILINet or Google Flu Trends data. The Massachusetts DiSTRIB-
uTE data, on the other hand, peak shortly after either the ILINet
or Google Flu Trends data, and again in late December.
There are two possible explanations for the patterns seen in
Figure 6, both of which could be operating simultaneously. One
hypothesis is that the fall wave actually did peak earlier in the
South, and indeed the difference in timing has been related to
differences in school starting dates [29]. The Northeast peak lags
behind the South’s by about two months, however, much longer
than the difference in school start times. Moreover, it seems highly
unlikely that a pandemic virus capable of spreading around the
world in a matter of weeks would take two months to travel up the
east coast of the United States from the South to the Northeast.
The alternative hypothesis is that both the ILINet and Google Flu
Trends data both reflect regional concerns about pH1N1, based in
part on the local media. This hypothesis is supported by seeing the
same regional patterns in the Google Insights ‘‘Swine Flu’’ activity
index (Figure 1 Panel B), which is intended to reflect general
searches rather than searches based on one’s own symptoms.
Furthermore, a two-week delay between the ILINet peak in the
Northeast and the peaks in both Google data sources for
Massachusetts further suggests that the ILINet peak represents
people seeking care out of concern about pH1N1 rather than
symptoms alone. Thus, although there could be some real
differences in timing between the South and the Northeast, it
seems likely that ILINet and Google Flu Trends data at least
partially reflect regional differences in concerns about pH1N1.
Discussion
From a systems perspective, public health surveillance data are
the product of a series of decisions made by patients, health care
providers, and public health professionals about seeking and
providing health care and about reporting cases or otherwise
taking action that comes to the attention of health authorities. And
all of these decisions are potentially influenced by what these
people know and think. Outpatient, hospital-based, and ED
surveillance systems, for instance, all rely on individuals deciding
to present themselves to obtain health care, and these decisions are
based in part on their interpretations of their symptoms. Even the
number of Google searches and self-reports of ILI in the BRFSS
survey can be influenced by individuals’ interpretation of the
seriousness of their symptoms. Virologic surveillance and systems
based on laboratory confirmations depend on physicians deciding
to send specimens for testing. Every element of this decision-
making is potentially influenced by the informational and policy
environment (e.g. media coverage, current case definitions and
practice recommendations, implementation of active surveillance),
processing and reacting to the information on an individual level
Figure 5. Laboratory-confirmed influenza cases reported to CDC by U.S. WHO/NREVSS collaborating laboratories, national summary, 2008–
09. Source: CDC Flu View, 2008–2009 Influenza Season Week 25 ending June 27, 2009. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/
weeklyarchives2008-2009/weekly25.htm.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040984.g005
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(e.g. health care seeker’s self-assessment of risk, incentives for
seeking medical attention and self-isolation; health care provider’s
ordering of laboratory tests), and technical barriers (e.g. commu-
nication infrastructure for data exchange, laboratory capacity).
Because all of these factors change over time, so did the biases in
the surveillance data, and as a result the U.S. public health system’
ability to characterize and track the pH1N1 was compromised.
Although this analysis is limited by the lack of a gold standard –
definitive knowledge of the actual number of pH1N1 cases and the
characteristics of the individuals who are affected – a triangulation
approach that compares multiple data systems, each with different
expected biases over time, strongly suggests that children and
young adults are over-represented in many pH1N1 surveillance
systems, especially in the spring wave. In other words, children and
young adults may not have been ‘‘at risk’’ to the extent that some
thought, but rather the perception that they were led to
surveillance results that supported this perception. And because
ILINet, ED surveillance data, and other syndromic surveillance
systems that depend on counts of people seeking care, especially
for children, are influenced by the information environment, some
apparent trends and geographic differences were, in part,
reflections of what people thought was happening rather than
actual numbers of cases. Comparing data from the spring and fall
wave of pH1N1 in Wales, Keramarou and colleagues find a
similar effect, with relatively more ILI visits in the Spring when
media activity was intense and fewer in the Fall when media
activity waned [30]. Chowell and colleagues also note that in
Mexico the median age of laboratory-confirmed ILI cases was 18
years overall in 2009, but increased to 31 years during the fall
wave. In France, ILI cases peaked in the first week of September
(week 36), but according to virologic and clinical data the
pandemic started in mid-October (week 44). Casalengo and
colleagues [31] note that many of the early ILI cases were actually
rhinovirus and other non-influenza viruses, and attribute the
September increase in pediatric ILI cases to massive media
coverage at the start of the school year and the general level of
anxiety at that time.
Of course, epidemiologists recognize these potential biases and
typically note them and present their analysis of the available data
with appropriate caveats. But especially when the crisis is acute
and need for information urgent, what seem like subtle method-
ological points to policymakers and the public can easily become
lost. Even straightforward points can be confused. For instance,
the dramatic increase in week 17 in the height of the colored bar in
Figure 5 seems consistent with the alarmist headlines at that time
and can easily be misinterpreted as a sudden increases in
pandemic cases. In fact, as the analysis (and even just a careful
reading of the graph) shows, this increase mainly reflects an
increase in the number of samples submitted for testing rather
than the percentage that are positive for pH1N1.
Confusion about whether children and young adults were more
‘‘at risk’’ for pH1N1 is compounded by different ideas about the
meaning of risk. This term can mean the probability that one is
infected, develop symptoms, requires hospitalization, or dies.
Furthermore, the risk of severe consequences can be figured in
terms of those who are infected or develop symptoms or in terms
of everyone in some demographic group. Careful analysis of the
data suggests that children and young adults do seem to have been
more likely than older people to have been infected with pH1N1.
On the other hand, the relative proportions of infected cases – or
of the population – who die or require hospitalization may be
higher for older adults. The pH1N1 surveillance literature uses
nearly all of the possible definitions of risk, often with little clarify
about which one is intended, and this further confuses public
understanding of the situation. Minor differences among surveil-
lance systems regarding standard age groupings, for instance, and
differences in standard data presentation formats also adds to
confusion.
The tendency to report cumulative case counts, especially in the
early days of the pandemic, also complicated the interpretation of
the data. By definition, cumulative case counts can only increase –
they are not reduced as people regain their health or die after a
course of illness – even if the incidence of new cases peaks.
Cumulative counts also increase as new cases that occurred before
Figure 6. Influenza-like illness surveillance for the Northeast, South and entire United States. Panel A. Percentage of visits for influenza-
like illness (ILINet), U.S. and South, July 31, 2009–January 8, 2010; Google Flu Trends index, U.S. and Georgia (GA), August 2, 2009–January 10, 2010;
scaled DiSTRIBuTE ILI trends, Georgia (GA), October 3, 2009–January 9, 2010. Panel B. Percentage of visits for influenza-like illness (ILINet), U.S. and
Northeast (NE), July 31, 2009–January 8, 2010; Google Flu Trends index, U.S. and Massachusetts (MA), August 2, 2009–January 10, 2010; scaled
DiSTRIBuTE ILI trends, Massachusetts (MA), October 3, 2009–January 9, 2010. Sources: author’s calculations based on CDC, Google, and DiSTRIBuTE
data available from: http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm, http://www.google.org/flutrends/, and http://isdsdistribute.org/moreinfo.php.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040984.g006
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epidemiologists were aware of the outbreak are discovered.
Perhaps because case counts are a feature of other types of
disasters, policy makers expect them in disease outbreaks, but
presenting the data in this way can lead to misunderstandings.
This analysis benefits from hindsight, and is not intended as a
criticism of the epidemiologists who had the much more difficult
challenge of interpreting the data as the pandemic was emerging
and spreading through the population. Indeed, the goal is not to
question the epidemiology of pH1N1 but rather to learn from the
U.S. experience about the performance of critical surveillance
systems. In addition, this analysis adopts an outsiders’ perspective,
that is, we are not aware of all the information – or the pressures –
that epidemiologists faced during the pandemic. While in some
ways this is a limitation, in other respects it allows us to question
some of the assumptions that, in the press of time and events, the
public health officials dealing with pH1N1 may not have had the
luxury of doing.
Data and Methods
This analysis is a retrospective secondary analysis of a variety of
data sources that were used to track pH1N1 in the United States in
2009, some of which were developed especially for this purpose.
Many of these systems are operated by the CDC; these include
systems for virologic surveillance and for tracking outpatient
illness, influenza-associated hospitalizations, pneumonia- and
influenza-related mortality, and influenza-associated pediatric
deaths, and the geographic spread of influenza [2]. Other data
are provided by state and local health departments as well as
private sector organizations as described below.
The primary means for virologic surveillance is the WHO-
affiliated National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance
System (NREVSS), through which 140 public and private sector
collaborating laboratories submit weekly information on the total
number of respiratory specimens tested for influenza and the
number positive by influenza type, subtype, and age group [2].
Outpatient illness surveillance is conducted by CDC’s Influen-
za-Like Illness Surveillance Network (ILINet) system. ILINet
receives weekly reports from more than 3,300 health care
providers on the total number of patients seen for any reason
and the number of patients with ILI, by age group, defined as a
temperature of .37.8 C and cough and/or sore throat, in the
absence of a known cause other than influenza [2]. In addition,
since late 2009 CDC has partnered with the International Society
for Disease Surveillance (ISDS) through the DiSTRIBuTE project
(Distributed Surveillance Taskforce for Real-time Influenza
Burden Tracking and Evaluation) to gather and analyze aggregate
Emergency Department (ED) surveillance data from a number of
state and local jurisdictions, each using its own definition of ILI
[32]. Our analysis also utilizes ED data from an integrated health
system operating 18 hospitals in a western state [25].
CDC, in collaboration with state health departments and
academic centers in 10 states collects data on laboratory confirmed
influenza-associated hospitalizations in children and adults
through the Emerging Infections Program (EIP). This popula-
tion-based surveillance is conducted in 60 counties that represent
7% of the U.S. population [2]. In 2009, the New York State
Department of Health supplemented this system with its Sentinel
Hospital Program (SHP). This includes data from six large
hospitals serving parts of New York not included in the EIP that
reported the number of patients who were admitted with the chief
complaint of ILI and submit up to 20 respiratory specimens per
week for confirmatory pH1N1 testing by PCR. ILI was defined as
temperature of .37.8 C and cough and/or sore throat [27].
CDC collects timely, influenza-associated mortality data
through two different systems. The 122 Cities Mortality Reporting
System receives data from 122 cities throughout the U.S. on the
total number of death certificates received and the number of
those for which pneumonia or influenza was listed as the
underlying or contributing cause of death. The Influenza-
Associated Pediatric Mortality Surveillance System tracks labora-
tory-confirmed influenza-related deaths among children under 18
years of age based on reports submitted by state, local, and
territorial health departments [2]. In addition, starting in August
2009 CDC requested that states submit aggregate data on
hospitalizations and deaths due to influenza using either a
laboratory-confirmed or syndromic case definition through its
new Aggregate Hospitalizations and Deaths Reporting Activity
(AHDRA) reporting system.
Another innovation in 2009 was the development and
implementation of a module for CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS) to provide data on ILI in the
community. Between September 2009 and March 2010, more
than 250,000 adults and children responding to this ongoing state-
based population survey were asked about their own ILI, which
was defined as the presence of fever with cough or sore throat, in
the previous month [23].
The geographic distribution of influenza activity across the
United States is reported weekly by state and territorial
epidemiologists. States report influenza activity as no activity,
sporadic, local, regional, or widespread [2]. In addition, many of
the surveillance data systems described above provide regional or
state level data, which are available in CDC’s Weekly Influenza
Surveillance Report FluView.
The final data sources for our analysis come from Google.
Google Flu Trends is based on the number of queries using a
specific set of flu-related search terms that they have found to be
related, in the aggregate, to the number of people who have flu
symptoms [33]. Google Insights for Search is a more generic tool
for quantifying the relative number of Google searches on a
certain topic on a weekly basis [34]. For our analysis we used the
number of internet searches for ‘‘swine flu’’ (‘‘H1N1’’ was similar
during the Fall of 2009 but was uncommon in the Spring). We also
restricted the analysis to searches for swine flu news items. The
information environment, of course, is far more complex than
these indices can represent, but they provide an objective general
sense of public interest and concern.
Because there are no data that describe the actual rates of
pH1N1 infection in the United States, or its consequences, we
adopted a ‘‘triangulation’’ approach [35] in which multiple
contemporary data sources, each with different expected biases,
are compared to identify time patterns that are likely to reflect
biases versus those that are more likely to be indicative of actual
infection rates. This public health systems research approach is
grounded in the understanding that each of these surveillance
systems is a production process. From this perspective, surveillance
data are the result of a series of decisions made by patients, health
care providers, and public health professionals about seeking and
providing health care and about reporting cases to health
authorities. Outpatient, hospital-based, and ED surveillance
systems, for instance, all rely on individuals deciding to present
themselves to the health care system based on their interpretations
of their symptoms. Even the number of Google searches and self-
reports of ILI in the BRFSS survey can be influenced by their
interpretation of the seriousness of their symptoms. Virologic
surveillance and systems based on laboratory confirmations all
depend on physicians deciding to send samples for testing.
Moreover, every element of this decision-making is influenced
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by the informational environment (i.e. media coverage, imple-
mentation of active surveillance), processing and reacting to the
information on an individual level (i.e. the health care seeker’s self-
assessment of risk, incentives for seeking medical attention and
self-isolation, the health care provider’s ordering of laboratory
tests), and technical barriers (i.e. communication infrastructure for
data exchange, laboratory capacity), all of which change
constantly.
Conclusions
The U.S. public health surveillance response to pH1N1 offers
much to admire. Together with surveillance activities in Mexico,
and benefiting from advances in laboratory capacity and
notification systems introduced in the previous decade, epidemi-
ologists relatively quickly identified and characterized a new
pathogen, allowing the CDC and shortly afterwards the WHO to
issue alerts about the emergence of a new pandemic strain,
triggering a rapid global public health response to H1N1 [8].
These alerts triggered pandemic influenza plans that had been
prepared in recent years, which focused initially on surveillance
activities, including the development of a case definition and
testing procedures, and non-pharmaceutical control measures. A
variety of existing influenza surveillance systems were supple-
mented with newly developed ad hoc systems to provide timely
information to guide policy makers and monitor the public health
response [2].
However, although not definitive, our analysis of the of the
public health surveillance systems that provided situational
awareness in the United States calls into question two aspects of
the conventional wisdom about the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. In
particular, children and young adults might not have experienced
higher risks of suffering severe consequences as some thought.
Furthermore, apparent patterns in the timing and relative size of
the Spring and fall wave, and of geographical differences in timing
of the fall wave, seem to depend in large part on perceptions of
what was happening. Although the extent of the biases suggested
by this analysis cannot be known precisely, the analysis identifies
underlying problems with surveillance systems – in particular their
dependence on patient and provider behavior, which is influenced
by a changing information environment – that could limit
situational awareness in future public health emergencies.
These problems are particularly germane for syndromic
surveillance systems, which are highly dependent on individuals’
decisions to stay home from school, self-treat, or seek health care,
and thus on changes in the information environment. The earliest
appearance of the pandemic did not trigger a quantitative alert in
any of these systems, either in Mexico or in the United States [22].
Lipsitch and colleagues report both instances in which syndromic
surveillance was thought to be effective for situational awareness
and others in which it was misleading [22]. Our analysis of the
pH1N1 experience and another comparing syndromic surveillance
systems in the Fall of 2011 at two universities [36] do not support
the PCAST report’s enthusiastic endorsement of this approach for
situational awareness [3].
Similarly, this analysis has implications for the on-going
redesign of the CDC BioSense program, which was originally
mandated in the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act
of 2002 to establish an integrated national public health
surveillance system for early detection and rapid assessment of
potential bioterrorism-related illness [37]. Current re-design efforts
focus on building a network of syndromic surveillance systems and
a community of surveillance practitioners who share data and
interpretations, including enhancements to the data acquisition
process to improve data quality and timeliness [38]. In this context
as in other information technology discussions, data quality and
timeliness refer to the transfer of information from the source to
the point of analysis, that is efforts to ensure that data from
hospitals or other health care providers is transmitted quickly and
without loss of fidelity to BioSense analysts. The proposed
enhancements do not address the biases identified in this paper,
which affect the quality of epidemiologic information – as opposed
to the data – that BioSense produces.
Our analysis is not intended as a criticism of the epidemiologists
charged with the immense challenge of tracking the impact of a
new pathogen. Rather, this analysis shows how fundamentally
difficult the surveillance challenge is, and sheds light on the
adequacy of existing surveillance systems for such efforts. As with
most novel pathogens, the emergence of pH1N1 was characterized
by uncertainty that took weeks to months to resolve. Epidemiol-
ogists familiar with the emergence of novel pathogens rightly
compare the rapidly evolving facts and scientific knowledge to the
‘‘fog of war,’’ [39], and the United Kingdom’s Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Programme has shown how it should be factored
into public health preparedness planning [40]. Many emergency
preparedness professionals, however, still think in terms of single
cases triggering a response in hours or days, and this thinking is
reflected in such key public health preparedness documents as
CDC’s 2011 Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards
for State and Local Planning [41]. A more appropriate response would
be a plan to step up surveillance efforts early in the event to fill in
the uncertainties apparent in the original data.
Moreover, to the extent that future public health crises are
characterized by similar unknowns, this analysis of the 2009 H1N1
experience identified a root cause that is likely to be problematical
in the future: surveillance systems that depend on patients and
providers taking action – to seek care, to send samples for testing,
and so on. These actions depend, to some extent, on what people
hear in the media and official reports, creating an inherent
circularity that is difficult to disentangle. This problem is most
prominent in surveillance systems based on reported cases, but
also affects everything from syndromic surveillance systems that
monitor individuals’ decisions to seek health care to virologic
surveillance systems that depend on physicians submitting
specimens to be tested. This is yet another example of how case-
based surveillance systems can lead to biased statistical data [42].
Similarly, Lipsitch and colleagues [22,43] and Garske and
colleagues [44] both show how biased case ascertainment
especially early in the pH1N1 pandemic led to over-estimating
the case fatality rate.
The optimal solution is to develop population-based surveil-
lance systems that are less dependent on individuals’ and their
physicians’ decisions, and thus less sensitive to the circular effect of
the media environment. Lipsitch and colleagues, for instance, have
suggested identifying well-defined population cohorts at high risk
for pH1N1 infection and ensuring that everyone in that group is
tested to avoid biases due to physician decisions about who should
be tested [43]. Kok and Dywer review a number of possible
designs [45], and Lipsitch and colleagues [22] describe their
beneficial effects. Another possibility is to make more timely use of
on-going national population-based surveys such as CDC’S
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). This was
used in 2009 to provide monthly data on the proportion of the
population with influenza-like symptoms, but the results were not
published until long after the pandemic wave had passed [23].
New York City mounted a more limited but also more timely
telephone survey in May and June, 2009 [46]. With proper
planning and statistical techniques, the same survey could be used
to produce more timely data. Ultimately, a population-based
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seroprevalence survey, like those deployed in the United Kingdom
[47] and Hong Kong [48] would provide the least biased data on
who is at risk for infection as well as temporal and geographic
patterns. The benefits of such studies, however, are tempered by
practicalities of obtaining informed consent, the unavailability and
limitations of early serologic tests, as well as the costs, so Lipsitch
and colleagues conclude that a large-scale prepandemic invest-
ment would be needed to improve current influenza serologic
assay technology sufficiently so that valid serologic tests could be
developed quickly at the start of the next pandemic [22].
Other problems sprang from common difficulties in clearly
presenting scientific information to policymakers and the public.
Epidemiologists were aware of the distinction between the risk of
pH1N1 infection and its consequences, yet policymakers devel-
oped immunization strategies and priorities predicated on the
assumption that children were at high risk of its consequences.
Presumably this also reflects a general concern for and need to
protect children, but surely population perceptions about children
being ‘‘at risk’’ contributed to this. One might argue that
epidemiologists cannot control how their data are used, but the
standard definition of public health surveillance is the ‘‘ongoing,
systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of health-related
data essential to the planning, implementation, and evaluation of
public health practice, closely integrated with the timely dissemination of
these data to those responsible for prevention and control’’ (emphasis added)
[49].
Beyond considerations of needed surveillance system improve-
ments, this analysis also has implications for how to measure
preparedness. For instance, CDC’s and the Trust for America’s
Health’s most recent state-by-statement assessments of public
health preparedness focus on ensuring that state and local public
health laboratories have the capacity to respond rapidly, identify or
rule out particular known biological agents, and increase the
workforce and laboratory throughput needed to process large
numbers of samples during an emergency [50,51]. None of these
measures would have ensured that public health surveillance
systems could have avoided the biases identified in this analysis
and accurately tracked who was at risk for pH1N1 and monitored
the development of the pandemic over time and in different
geographical areas. Nor did syndromic surveillance or other
approaches to harnessing the vast amounts of data in electronic
medical records avoid problems with bias in 2009 or could be
expected to do so in the future. Although these capacities are
clearly necessary, they are not sufficient. Rather, assessing the
nation’s level of preparedness requires measures of the systems
capability to accurately track an outbreak and characterize its risks,
and to communicate this information clearly to policy makers.
In addition to its substantive contributions, this analysis
illustrates the quality improvement (QI) approach called for in
the U.S. National Health Security Strategy (NHSS) [52].
Emphasizing processes (chains of events that produce specific
outcomes) and systems of people and information, the QI
approach refers to a range of specific practices including
procedures and system changes based on their effects on
measurable outcomes, reducing unnecessary variability in out-
comes while preserving system differences that are critical to the
specific environment, continuous improvement rather than
onetime initiatives, and critical event/failure mode analysis. In
general, our analysis is an example of an effort ‘‘to collect data on
performance measures from real incidents … analyze performance
data to identify gaps, [and] recommend and apply programs to
mitigate those gaps,’’ an approach called for in the NHSS
Implementation Guide [53].
Learning about public health systems’ emergency response
capabilities is challenging because actual events are unique, and
both the epidemiological facts and the context varies from one
community to another. In other words, there is no replication, a
centerpiece of the scientific method. In this context, to address the
lack of a gold standard to describe the actual trends in the rate of
pH1N1 infection and its consequences over time, we adopted a
‘‘triangulation’’ approach that compares multiple data sources,
each with different likely biases. We focus specifically on two time
periods, the month of May when the Spring peak occurred and the
fall wave, which started at the end of August and continued
through November. In the Fall, we also focus on the South and the
Northeast regions of the United States, which respectively had the
earliest and latest fall peaks. Statistical calculations were limited to
simple data transformations to ease comparability and graphical
analysis. This type of analysis is necessarily qualitative and
contextual; rather than serving as a recipe for doing this in other
settings, this analysis should be seen as an example that illustrates
the concept. Similar analyses of other events will require a
different approach.
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